Pilot-to-Production Funnel

103 pilots · through 2026-06 · $68,000 of hardware per unit on loan · synthetic data
Pilots started
103
30 still open
Conversion rate
32%
of decided pilots
Median time to production
6 mo
True CAC
$580,489
5.3x the naive $109,630
Hardware at prospect sites
$3.7M
earning nothing
The number that changes the conversation: naive CAC counts only the pilots you won — $109,630. True CAC divides all pilot cost by the wins: $580,489, or 5.3×. The lost and stalled pilots are not overhead; they are the cost of acquiring the customers you did win. At an average $191,585 ACV and 68% deployment gross margin, a won customer produces about $130K of gross profit a year — so a three-year contract recovers roughly $391K against $580K of CAC, leaving $190K unrecovered. The minimum term that clears the hurdle is about 4.5 years — longer than customers will sign. The blunt conclusion: as currently run, this acquisition motion does not pay back on any realistic contract term. (An earlier version of this page called the three-year term "workable" off a revenue-basis ratio; an external review correctly called the contradiction — gross profit, not revenue, repays CAC.)

The counterfactual is what makes this fixable rather than fatal: had only the qualified pilots been run — named sponsor plus written success criteria — true CAC would be $170,357, repaid by gross profit in about 16 months — comfortably inside a three-year term. The unqualified pilots are not underperforming; they are the entire reason the motion as a whole does not pay for itself, and a qualification gate is the difference between a broken funnel and a working one.

The funnel

Pilots started: 103Decided: 73Converted: 23

F1 — Conversion by pilot age

0%25%50%9-month purgatory line44%0-3mon=952%4-6mon=2129%7-9mon=240%10-12mon=1011%13mo+n=9
Rates are computed on decided pilots only — the 30 still open are right-censored and excluded, so recent cohorts' rates can move as they resolve. Conversion collapses past the 9-month mark. That makes pilot purgatory datable, which is what turns "we should probably close some of these" into a defensible kill rule with a number attached. Everything to the right of the dashed line is engineering capacity being spent at close to zero expected return.

F2 — Conversion by qualification quality

QualificationPilotsDecided ConversionCostACV won
sponsor + criteria282654%$2.38M$2.54M
sponsor only20138%$2.96M$0.16M
criteria only352330%$5.24M$1.52M
neither20119%$2.77M$0.18M
A named executive sponsor and written success criteria is the difference between a pilot and an experiment. The unqualified cohort consumes real cost and returns little — the cheapest intervention available here is a qualification gate before a robot ever ships, not a better pilot.

Pilot purgatory — open longer than 9 months

PilotCompanyIndustry AgeSunk cost Hardware on site
P0013Halcyon Cocold chain27 mo$261,250$204,000
P0003Brightpath Cofood bev29 mo$235,875$68,000
P0050Northwind Comanufacturing16 mo$210,500$136,000
P0065Cascade Groupfood bev12 mo$196,000$204,000
P0057Cascade Grouplogistics14 mo$192,375$68,000
P0068Maple Groupcold chain11 mo$181,500$136,000
P0072Meridian Partnersfood bev10 mo$167,000$136,000
P0073Foxglove Industriesautomotive10 mo$167,000$68,000
P0074Ridgeline Industriescold chain10 mo$145,250$68,000
9 pilots, $1,756,750 sunk, and $1,088,000 of hardware sitting at prospect sites earning nothing. This is the list to work, and the finance recommendation is not "try harder" — it is a decision date on each one, and recovery of the units from the ones that miss it.